Security aspects of the index coding with side information (ICSI) problem are investigated. Building on the results of Bar-Yossef et al. (2006), the properties of linear index codes are further explored. The notion of weak security, considered by Bhattad and Narayanan (2005) in the context of network coding, is generalized to block security.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE PROBLEM OF index coding with side information (ICSI) was introduced by Birk and Kol [1] , [2] . It was motivated by applications such as audio and video-on-demand, and daily newspaper delivery. In these applications, a server (sender) has to deliver some sets of data, audio or video files to a set of clients (receivers), different sets are requested by different receivers. Assume that before the transmission starts, the receivers have already (from previous transmissions) some files or movies in their possession. Via a slow backward channel, the receivers can let the sender know which messages they already have in their possession, and which messages they request. By exploiting this information, the amount of the overall transmissions can be reduced. As was observed in [1] , this can be achieved by coding the messages at the server before broadcasting them out. Another possible application of the ICSI problem is in opportunistic wireless networks. These are networks in which a wireless node can opportunistically listen to the wireless channel. As a result, the node may obtain packets that were not designated to it [3] - [5] . This way, a node obtains some side information about the transmitted data. Exploiting this additional knowledge may help to increase the throughput of the system.
Consider the toy example in Fig. 1 . It presents a scenario with one sender and four receivers. Each receiver requires a different information packet (or message). The naïve approach requires four separate transmissions, one transmission per an information packet. However, by exploiting the knowledge of the subsets of messages that clients already have, and by using coding of the transmitted data, the server can satisfy all the demands by broadcasting just one coded packet.
The ICSI problem has been a subject of several recent studies [3] , [6] - [12] . This problem can be regarded as a special case of the well-known network coding (NC) problem [13] , [14] . In particular, it was shown that every instance of the NC problem can be reduced to an instance of the ICSI problem [3] , [10] .
Several previous works focused on the design of an efficient index code for the ICSI problem. Given an instance of the ICSI problem, Bar-Yossef et al. [6] proved that finding the best scalar linear binary index code is equivalent to finding the so-called min-rank of a graph, which is known to be an NP-hard problem [6] , [15] . Here, scalar linear index codes refer to linear index codes in which each message is a symbol in the field . By contrast, in vector linear index codes, each message is a vector over . Lubetzky and Stav [7] showed that there exist instances in which scalar linear index codes over nonbinary fields and linear index codes over mixed fields outperform the scalar linear binary index codes. El Rouayheb et al. [3] , [10] showed that for certain instances of the ICSI problem, vector linear index codes achieve strictly higher transmission rate than scalar linear index codes do. They also pointed out that there exist instances in which vector nonlinear index codes outperform vector linear index codes. Vector nonlinear index codes were also shown to outperform scalar nonlinear index codes for certain instances by Alon et al. [12] . Several heuristic solutions for the ICSI problem were proposed in [9] and [11] .
In this paper, we study the security aspects of linear index codes. We restrict ourselves to scalar linear index codes. It is known that vector linear index codes can achieve better transmission rate than their scalar counterparts, for certain instances of the ICSI problem [3] , [10] . However, if the block length is fixed, one can model a vector index code as a scalar index code applied to another instance of the ICSI problem. If the block length is , the number of messages is , and the number of receivers is in the original (vector) instance, then the equivalent (scalar) instance can be viewed as having messages and receivers.
Let be a finite field with elements. A linear index code maps onto , where is an matrix over , and ,
. In this paper, we show that each linear index code provides a certain level of information security. More specifically, let the code be spanned by the columns of , and let and be its minimum distance and dual distance, respectively. We say that a particular adversary is of strength if it has messages in its possession. Then, we show that the index code based on is -block secure against all adversaries of strength and is completely insecure against any adversary of strength at least . If is an MDS code, then the two bounds coincide. The technique used in the proof for this result is reminiscent of that used in the constructions of (multiple) secret sharing schemes from linear error-correcting codes [16] , [17] . The results on the security of linear index codes can be further employed to analyze the existence of solutions for a natural generalization of the ICSI problem, so-called the index coding with side and restricted information (ICSRI) problem. In that problem, it is required that some receivers have no information about some messages.
In the sequel, we also consider a linear randomized index code, which is based on the use of random symbols. We show that the coset coding technique (which has been successfully employed in secure NC literature; see, for instance, [18] - [22] ) yields an optimal strongly secure linear randomized index code of length . This randomized index code is strongly secure against an adversary which (i) has arbitrary messages in advance;
(ii) eavesdrops at most transmissions; (iii) corrupts at most transmissions. Here, denotes the min-rank over of the side information graph corresponding to the instance of the index coding (IC) problem.
Most of previous works on the security aspects (and on the error-correction aspect, as a special case) of network coding dealt with the multicast scenario. One of the main reasons for this limitation is that the optimal simultaneous transmission rates for nonmulticast networks have not been fully characterized yet. The ICSI problem can be modeled as a special case of the nonmulticast NC problem [3] , [12] . Moreover, being modeled in that way, it requires that there are directed edges from particular sources to each sink, which provide the side information. The symbols transmitted on these special edges are not allowed to be corrupted, where usually for NC any edge can be corrupted. These two differences restrict the ability to derive the results on the security of the IC schemes from the existing results on security of NC schemes.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Recall that we use the notation for the finite field with elements, where is a power of prime. We also use for the set of all nonzero elements of . Let denote the set of integers . For the vectors and , the (Hamming) distance between and is defined to be the number of coordinates where and differ, namely
The support of a vector is defined to be the set . The (Hamming) weight of a vector , denoted , is defined to be , the number of nonzero coordinates of .
A -dimensional subspace of is called a linear ( -ary) code if the minimum distance of is equal to . Sometimes, we may use the notation for the sake of simplicity. The vectors in are called codewords. It is easy to see that the minimum weight of a nonzero codeword in a linear code is equal to its minimum distance . A generator matrix of an -code is a matrix whose rows are linearly independent codewords of . Then, . The dual code or dual space of is defined as . The minimum distance of , , is called the dual distance of . The following upper bound on the minimum distance of a -ary linear code is well known (see [23, Ch. 1] ). We use to denote the unit vector, which has a one at the th position, and zeros elsewhere. We also use , , to denote the identity matrix. We recall the following well-known result in coding theory.
Theorem 2.2 ([24, p. 66]): Let be an
-code with dual distance and denote the matrix whose rows are codewords of . If , then each -tuple from appears in an arbitrary set of columns of exactly times.
For a random vector and a subset of , where , let denote the vector . For an matrix , let denote the th row of , and its th column. For a set , let denote the submatrix of formed by rows of which are indexed by the elements of . For a set , let denote the submatrix of formed by columns of which are indexed by the elements of .
Let and be discrete random variables taking values in the sets and , respectively. Let denote the probability that takes a particular value . Let , ,
, and denote the (binary) entropy, conditional entropy, mutual information, and conditional mutual information (see [25] for the background).
III. INDEX CODING AND SOME BASIC RESULTS
The ICSI problem considers the following communications scenario. There is a unique sender (or source) , who has a vector of messages in his possession, which is a realized value of a random vector . , hereafter, are assumed to be independent uniformly distributed random variables over . There are also receivers . For each , has some side information, i.e., owns a subset of messages , . In addition, each , , is interested in receiving the message , for some demand function . Here, we assume that for all . Let . An instance of the ICSI problem is given by a quadruple . Here, we assume that every receiver requests exactly one message. This assumption is not a limitation of the model, as we can consider an equivalent problem by splitting each receiver who requests multiple messages into multiple receivers, each of whom requests exactly one message and have the same set of side information [1] , [6] . is called the length of the index code. In the scheme corresponding to this code, broadcasts a vector of length over .
Definition 3.2:
An index code of the shortest possible length is called optimal. Definition 3.3: A linear index code is an index code, for which the encoding function is a linear transformation over . Such a code can be described as where is an matrix over . The matrix is called the matrix corresponding to the index code . We also refer to as the index code based on . Notice that the length of is the number of columns of .
Let and . In the sequel, we write if . Intuitively, this means that if some receiver knows for all (and also knows ), then this receiver is also able to compute the value of . Hereafter, we assume that the sets , for all , are known to . Moreover, we also assume that the index code is known to each receiver , . In practice, this can be achieved by a preliminary communication session, when the knowledge of the sets , for all , and of the code are disseminated between the participants of the scheme.
In [6] , for the case and for all , the side information graph of an instance of the ICSI problem is defined by , where and
Then, the -over of the side information graph is defined by (2) Let , the subspace spanned by the (transposed) columns of . The following lemma was implicitly formulated in [6] for the case where , for all , and . This lemma specifies a sufficient condition on so that a receiver can reconstruct a particular message. We reproduce this lemma with its proof in its general form for the sake of completeness of the presentation. 
Proof: Assume that and . Since
, there exists such that By taking the transpose and premultiplying by , we obtain Therefore Observe that is able to find and from the knowledge of . Moreover, is also able to compute since . Additionally, knows , which is transmitted by . Therefore, is able to compute .
Remark 3.2:
It follows from Lemma 3.1 that corresponds to a linear -IC over if , for some , . We show later in Corollary 4.5 that this condition is also necessary. Finding such an with minimal number of columns by careful selection of 's is a difficult task (in fact it is NP-hard to do so, see [6] , [15] ), which, however, yields a linear coding scheme with the minimal number of transmissions.
IV. BLOCK SECURE LINEAR INDEX CODES

A. Block Security and Weak Security
In this section, we assume the presence of an adversary who can listen to all transmissions. Assume that employs a linear index code based on . The adversary is assumed to possess side information , where . For short, we say that knows (or possesses, owns)
. The strength of is defined to be . Denote . Note that by listening to , the adversary also knows . We define in the following several levels of security for linear index codes.
Definition 4.1: Suppose that the sender possesses a vector of messages
, which is a realized value of a random vector , whose coordinates , , are all independent and uniformly distributed over . An adversary possesses . Consider a linear -IC over based on . 1) For , the adversary is said to have no information about if
In other words, despite the partial knowledge on that the adversary has (his side information and the transmissions he eavesdrops), the symbols still looks completely random to him.
2) The index code is said to be -block secure against if for every -subset , the adversary has no information about .
3) The index code is said to be -block secure against all adversaries of strength if it is -block secure against for every , . 4) The index code is said to be weakly secure against if it is 1-block secure against . In other words, after listening to all transmissions, the adversary has no information about each particular message that he does not possess in the first place. 5) The index code is said to be weakly secure against all adversaries of strength if it is weakly secure against for every -subset of . 6) The index code is said to be completely insecure against if an adversary, who possesses , by listening to all transmissions, is able to determine for all . 7) The index code is said to be completely insecure against any adversary of strength if an adversary, who possesses an arbitrary set of messages, is always able to reconstruct all of the other messages after listening to all transmissions.
Remark 4.1:
Even when the index code is -block secure as defined previously, the adversary is still able to obtain information about dependences between various 's in (but he gains no information about any group of particular messages). This definition of -block security is a generalization of that of weak security (see [27] , [28] ). Obviously, if an index code is -block secure against then it is also weakly secure against , but the converse is not always true.
B. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Block Security
In the sequel, we consider the sets , , and ,
. Moreover, we assume that the sets , , and are disjoint, and that they form a partition of , namely . In particular, . 
Then, we have the following.
1) For all (7) 2) The system , which contradicts (6). 2) By (7) , each row of is a linear combination of rows of . Hence, is also a linear combination of rows of . Therefore, (8) has at least one solution.
The following lemma generalizes the weak security to the block security. 
In particular, for each , has no information about if and only if Proof: Assume that (9) holds. We need to show that . It suffices to show that for all (10) where for some . Consider the following linear system with the unknown :
which is equivalent to (11) In order to prove that (10) holds, it suffices to show that for all choices of , (11) always has the same number of solutions . Notice that the number of solutions of (11) is equal to the number of solutions of (12) where , , and are known. For any , if (12) has a solution, then it has exactly different solutions. Therefore, it suffices to prove that (12) has at least one solution for every . Since
, we have (13) Subtracting (13) from (12) we obtain which can be rewritten as (14) where , . Due to Lemma 4.2, (14) always has a solution , for every choice of . Therefore, (12) has at least one solution for every . Now we prove the converse. Assume that (9) (15) then is the shortest possible length of a linear -IC over .
Corollary 4.7:
The length of an optimal linear -IC over is .
Remark 4.8: The quantity defined in (15) is precisely the min-rank over of the side information graph of an ICSI instance in the case and for all (see also [6] ).
Proof: Suppose that for all . Let be the matrix whose th row is precisely , for each . Then, fits . Conversely, if fits , then by multiplying each row of with a suitable nonzero constant (which does not change the rank of ), one obtains a matrix of the form (1) . In other words, for each , the th row of the resulting matrix equals for some . Therefore, defined in (15) is indeed the minimum rank over of a matrix which fits the side information graph . Thus, is precisely the min-rank over of . which is equivalent to (16) The adversary attempts to solve this system. Given that and are known, the system (16) , we have . Therefore, by Theorem 4.9, the index code based on is weakly secure against . By the Singleton bound, has columns. In other words, the index code based on requires at most transmissions.
C. Block Security and Complete Insecurity
Theorem 4.9 provides a threshold for the security level of a linear index code based on . If has a prior knowledge of any messages, where , then the scheme is still secure, i.e., the adversary has no information about any group of particular messages from . On the other hand, the scheme may no longer be secure against an adversary of strength . The last assertion of Theorem 4.9 shows us the difference between being block secure and being strongly secure (the notion of strong security is rigorously defined in Definition 5.3 in the sequel). More specifically, if the scheme is strongly secure, the messages , which are not leaked to the adversary in advance, look completely random to the adversary, i.e., the probability to guess them correctly is . However, if the scheme is -block secure (for ), then the adversary is able to guess these messages correctly with probability . For an adversary of strength , the security of the scheme depends on the properties of the code employed, in particular, it depends on the weight distribution of . It is possible to show in the way analogous to the proof of part (2) in Theorem 4.9 that if there exists with , then the scheme is not weakly secure against corresponding adversary of strength . In general, the index code might still be ( -block or weakly) secure against some adversaries of strength for . While we cannot make a general conclusion on the security of the scheme when the adversary's strength is larger than , Lemma 4.3 is still a useful tool to evaluate the security in that situation. However, as the next theorem shows, if the size of is sufficiently large, then is able to determine all the messages in . . It is immediately clear that . Therefore, by Corollary 4.4, the adversary can reconstruct . We have shown that the index code is completely insecure against an arbitrary set satisfying , hence completing the proof.
When
is an MDS code, we have , and hence, the two bounds established in Theorems 4.9 and 4.10 are actually tight. In that case, the third statement in Theorem 4.9 implies Theorem 4.10 as follows. This statement asserts that an adversary of strength can find a list of vectors that includes the vector of messages . Since is an MDS code, we have . Therefore, the list contains only one element, namely itself. Thus, the index code is completely insecure against any adversary of strength . The following example further illustrates the results stated in these theorems. For , let such that . Assume that an index code based on with is used. For instance, we can take to be the matrix whose set of columns is . It is easy to see that is a Hamming code with and . Following the coding scheme, broadcasts the following four bits:
Each , , can compute by using a linear combination of , , , . Then, each can subtract (his side information) from to retrieve . For example, consider . Since subtracts from to obtain
If an adversary has a knowledge of a single message , then by Theorem 4.9, is not able to determine any other message , for . Indeed, , while , so the code is weakly secure against all adversaries of strength . If none of the messages are leaked, then the adversary has no information about any group of two messages. On the other hand, the code is completely insecure against any adversary of strength ; in that case, is able to determine the remaining messages.
Remark 4.11: So far we only discuss the case when the adversary can listen to all transmissions. If we consider an adversary, which can eavesdrop at most messages, then analogous results can also be obtained. Consider a linear index code based on . Let and Then, it is straightforward to see that the results in Theorems 4.9 and 4.10 still hold, with and being replaced by and , respectively.
D. Role of the Field Size
The following example demonstrates that the use of index codes over larger fields might have a positive impact on the security level. More specifically, in that example, index codes over large fields significantly enhance the security, compared with index codes over small fields.
Example 4.3:
Suppose that the source has messages . Assume that there are receivers , and each receiver has the same set of side information,
. Assume also that each requires , for . Any index code for this instance must have length at least , since all the vectors , for some , , are linearly independent over any field.
If we employ an index code over , by the fact that there are no nontrivial binary MDS codes, we deduce that the minimum distance of is at most . Hence, index codes over are not secure against some adversaries of strength . However, if we consider index codes over for sufficiently large , there exists a -ary MDS code with minimum distance exactly . By choosing so that , the index code based on is secure against all adversaries of strength at most , which is strictly more secure than the those over . To find such an , let be a generator matrix in standard form of an -MDS code, and then take . Then, , for some , . Therefore, by Corollary 4.5, corresponds to a linear index code for this instance.
Note that if we employ an index code over , then for large values of the minimum distance of is bounded from earlier by the sphere-packing bound where as , and denotes the inverse of the binary entropy function.
There is a variety of stronger upper bounds on the minimum distance of binary codes, such as the Johnson bound, the Elias bound, and the McEliece-Rodemich-Rumsey-Welch bound (see [29, Ch. 4 .5] for more details). These bounds provide even stronger bounds on the security of the binary scheme for this instance of the ICSI problem. By contrast, as shown previously, by using a -ary MDS code, the distance of can achieve the Singleton bound. It is well known that there is a significant gap between the Singleton bound and the sphere-packing bound (see [29, p. 111 ] for details). Therefore, for this instance of the ICSI problem, index codes over large fields provide significantly higher levels of security than those over binary field.
E. Application: ICSRI
In this section, we consider an extension of the ICSI problem, which we call the ICSRI problem. This problem arises in applications such as audio and video-on-demand. Consider a client who has subscribed for certain media content (audio or video programs, movies, newspapers, etc.) At the same time, this client has not subscribed to some other content. The content provider wants to restrict this client from obtaining a content which he is not eligible for, even though he might be able to obtain it "for free" from the transmissions provided by the server. As we show in sequel, the solution for the ICSRI problem is a straight-forward application of the results in Corollary 4.4.
More formally, the arguments of an instance of the ICSRI problem are similar to their counterparts for the ICSI problem. The new additional parameter, , represents the sets of message indices that the respective receivers , , are not allowed to obtain. The goal is that at the end of the communication round, the receiver has the message in its possession, for all
, and it has no information about for all . The notion of a linear -IC over is naturally extended to that of a linear -IC over . Let
The following proposition provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a linear index code to be also a solution to an instance of the ICSRI problem. Let if there are no choices of 's, , which satisfy (17) . The following proposition follows immediately.
Proposition 4.13:
The length of an optimal linear -IC over is . If , then there exist no linear -ICs over .
V. STRONGLY SECURE INDEX CODES WITH SIDE INFORMATION
In this section, we consider a different model of adversary. Similarly, to its counterpart in Section IV, the adversary in this section owns some prior side information. Additionally, can listen to transmissions of . It can also corrupt some transmissions of , received by any of , . We start the analysis with some basic definitions of error-correcting index codes. This type of index codes has been studied very recently by the authors of this paper in [30] . We repeat some basic results for the sake of completeness.
A. Error-Correcting Index Codes
Assume that some of the symbols received by , , are in error. Consider an ICSI instance , and assume that broadcasts a vector . Let be the error affecting the information received by , . Then, actually receives the vector instead of . The following definition is a generalization of Definition 3.1.
Definition 5.1: A -error-correcting index code over
for an instance of the ICSI problem, referred to as a -error-correcting -IC over , is an encoding function such that for each receiver , , there exists a decoding function satisfying The definitions of the length, of a linear index code, and of the matrix corresponding to an index code are naturally extended to -error-correcting index codes. We define the following sets:
For each , we also define Then, the collection of supports of all vectors in is precisely (18) The necessary and sufficient condition for a matrix to correspond to a linear -error-correcting index code is given in the following lemma. 
Denote . Then, the condition in (20) can be reformulated as follows: for all and for all such that and , it holds
The equivalent condition is that for all
Since for we have the condition (19) can be restated as for all and for all choices of nonzero , .
The next corollary follows directly from Lemma 5.1 by considering an error-free setup, i.e., . 
B. Lower Bound on the Length
We start this section with a generalization of the definition of index codes to randomized index codes. Consider random variables , which are distributed independently and uniformly over . Let and let be a realization of .
Definition 5.2:
An -randomized -IC over for an instance is an encoding function such that for each receiver , , there exists a decoding function satisfying for any , which is a realization of the random vector . The definition of a -error-correcting index code can be naturally extended to that of a -error-correcting randomized index code. We simply replace by , and by in Definition 5.1. An -randomized index code is linear over if it has a linear encoding function where is an matrix over . In the sequel, we assume that any message , , is requested by at least one receiver. Observe that by simply treating as messages, the results from previous sections still apply to linear randomized index codes.
Definition 5.3:
The linear -randomized -IC over based on is said to be -strongly secure if it has the following two properties.
1) This code is -error-correcting. In other words, upon receiving with at most coordinates in error, the receiver can still recover , for all . 2) This code is -strongly secure. In other words, an adversary who possesses , for , , and listens to at most transmissions, , gains no information about other messages. Equivalently for any , .
Remark 5.3: 1) If , then a -strongly secure -randomized -IC over is simply a -error-correcting -IC over .
2) If
, the index code is strongly secure, but has no error-correcting capability. In that case, we simply say that the code is " -strongly secure" instead of " -strongly secure." 3) A simple concatenation of an error-correcting IC scheme and a secure IC scheme may not necessarily yield a -strongly secure -randomized -IC over . By contrast, in Section V-C we present a somewhat more sophisticated scheme that yields a -strongly secure -randomized -IC over .
In the lemma that follows, we assume that each message is requested by at least one receiver. Otherwise, that "useless" message can be discarded without affecting the model. . Proof: Assume, by contradiction, that for some , we have for all . Consider a virtual receiver, which has a side information set , and requests the symbol . By Corollary 4.4, this virtual receiver has no information about after listening to all transmissions. In other words, we have (22) where all symbols in and are independent and uniformly distributed. In particular, for a smaller set of side information (23) We recall Definition 5.3: for every -subset and every -subset , we have (24) In the sequel, we show that if the value of is known to the adversary, this randomized index code is still -strongly secure. In other words, we aim to show that (25) for every -subset and every -subset . Indeed, the left-hand side of (25) is equal to which is due to (24) . Hence, it suffices to show that We have where the third transition is due to (22) and (23) .
To this end, we have shown that the randomized index code is still -strongly secure if the adversary knows the realized value of . Equivalently, discarding the random variable from the scheme does not affect its strong security. However, this contradicts Lemma 5.4, since the resulting code has less than random symbols.
The following theorem proves a lower bound on the length of a -strongly secure linear randomized index code.
Theorem 5.7: The length of a -strongly secure linear -randomized -IC over is at least .
Proof: Suppose the linear randomized index code is based on . We divide the proof into several cases. Case 1: . Then, by Corollary 4.5 and Lemma 5.6, the subspace must contain the following. 1) The vectors for some , for all .
2) The vectors , for some , for all . Due to linear independence of these vectors and to the definition of , the length of the code is at least Case 2:
, and for all there exists some vector such that . In this case, similarly to Case 1, we have Therefore, has at least columns. Case 3:
, and for some , for all . By following exactly the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 5.6, we deduce that discarding does not affect the strong security of the randomized index code. By doing so, we obtain a new randomized -strongly secure index code, which has random variables. This code is based on , which is obtained from by deleting its th row. The aforementioned argument can be applied until either the number of random variables decreases to , or the code in consideration satisfies the condition of Case 2. In both cases, the resulting randomized index code has length at least . As the length of the code does not change during the process, we conclude that the length of the original code is at least .
The next theorem establishes a lower bound on the length of a -strongly secure linear randomized index code. . Since all entries of are con-tained in , we deduce that corresponds to a -strongly secure -randomized -IC over . Therefore, by Theorem 5.7, has at least columns. Therefore, has at least columns.
C. A Construction of Optimal Strongly Secure Index Codes
In this section, we present a construction of an optimal -strongly secure -randomized linear -IC over , which has length attaining the lower bound established in Theorem 5.8. It requires to be at least . The proposed construction is based on the coset coding technique, originally introduced by Ozarow and Wyner [31] . This technique has been adopted in a variety of NC applications, such as in [18] - [22] . where are pairwise distinct nonzero elements in . Let be the submatrix of formed by the first rows, and the submatrix formed by the last rows of . Take
Lemma 5.9: The matrix in Construction A corresponds to a -error-correcting -randomized -IC over . Proof: Recall that is a random vector. The encoding function has a form Since is a generator matrix of a -error-correcting code, each receiver ,
, is able to recover if the number of errors in is less than or equal to . Therefore, each receiver can recover , and hence, it can also recover , , as corresponds to a linear -IC over .
Lemma 5.10: The matrix in Construction A corresponds to a -strongly secure -randomized -IC over .
Proof: Suppose that the adversary possess a message vector , . Additionally, can eavesdrop transmissions, i.e., it has a knowledge of , for some , . In the following, we show that the entropy of is not changed given the knowledge of and of . It suffices to show that for all (26) where all symbols in and are independent and uniformly distributed. The left-hand side of (26) can be re-written as (27) The numerator in (27) is given by (28) The penultimate transition can be explained as follows. We have (29) The matrix is invertible due to the fact that is a generator matrix of an -MDS code. Since is known, the system (29) has a unique solution given by
Since is uniformly distributed over
Similarly to (28) , the denominator in (27) is (30) From (27) , (28) , and (30), we obtain (26), as claimed.
From Theorem 5.8, Lemma 5.9, and Lemma 5.10, we obtain the main result of this section.
Theorem 5.11: The length of an optimal -strongly secure linear -randomized -IC over is . Moreover, the code in Construction A achieves this optimal length.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN QUESTIONS
In this paper, we initiate a study of the security aspects of linear index coding schemes. We introduce a notion of block se-curity and establish two bounds on the security level of a linear index code based on the matrix . These analysis makes use of the minimum distance and the dual distance of , the code spanned by the columns of . While the dimension of this code corresponds to the number of transmissions in the scheme, the minimum distance characterizes its security strength.
Our second contribution is the analysis of the strong security of linear index codes. New bounds on the length of linear index codes, which are resistant to errors, eavesdropping, and information leaking, are established. Index codes that achieve these bounds are constructed. These new bounds cannot be deduced directly from the existing results in network coding literature.
One important problem, which remains open, deals with a design of an optimal secure index coding scheme. This problem can be formulated as follows: given an instance of the ICSI problem, how to design , such that has the largest possible minimum distance? More specifically, let us define the binary side information matrix as in [6] , namely if otherwise.
The problem is equivalent to finding a way to turn certain off-diagonal 1's in into 0's, such that the rows of the resulting matrix generate an error-correcting code of the largest possible minimum distance. It is very likely that this task is a hard problem. For comparison, even finding the minimum distance of an error-correcting code given by its generating matrix is known to be NP-hard [32] .
